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SUMMARY
This paper directs attention to examining migration beyond the conventional bipolar 
model of origin-destination. It does so at two levels: conceptual and empirical. Con-
ceptually, it reviews recent trends to see migration as a more complex and diverse 
space-time process. Spatially, and especially within Europe, migration increasingly 
manifests itself in a variety of trajectories and pathways, which mix internal with in-
ternational moves, transit migration, onward migration, and back-and-forth moves. 
Temporally, a range of mobility forms, including return visits and cross-border shut-
tling, may be enfolded within longer-term migrations. Moving more specifically to 
onward migration, a series of examples is then reviewed, based on case-studies in 
the literature. In the final part of the article the authors present results from their re-
cent study of the onward migration of Albanians from Greece to the UK. Based on 10 
in-depth interviews with onward-migrated Albanians in London and Brighton, their 
reasons for leaving Greece, where they had been more-or-less successfully settled, 
are interrogated. They left because of the negative impact of the Greek economic 
crisis on their livelihoods, and because their acquisition of Greek citizenship gave 
them the freedom to move. Given their reluctance to return to Albania, which offers 
them few opportunities to advance their lives, they saw the UK as the best option, al-
though the spectre of Brexit disturbs this certainty. Interview data are also included 
on their memories of pre-migration life in Albania, and their impressions of their 
resettled lives in England.
KEY WORDS: onward migration, mobilities, Europe, the Greek crisis, Albanian mi-
grants
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INTRODUCTION
Europe’s map of migration constantly evolves, but recent years have seen 
a series of geopolitical and economic events which have more radically 
changed pre-existing patterns. From the dissolution of the Iron Curtain to 
successive “Eastern” enlargements of the European Union in 2004, 2007 and 
2013, the main geographic axis of migratory flows, which had been South-
North during the early postwar decades of labour migration, shifted to East-
West. As well as this geographic rotation, new migration temporalities also 
became evident. The demise of the Iron Curtain opened up new mobility 
types across the old East-West divide, including shuttle migration, irregular 
migration and other temporary and speculative moves that Okólski (2012) 
called “incomplete migration”. One of the most dramatic migratory epi-
sodes of this post-communist era was the sudden mass exodus from Alba-
nia, a non-EU country, to Greece and Italy, the longer-term ramifications of 
which are considered in the latter half of this paper. But it was the post-2004 
EU enlargements which did most to reorient the European migration map, 
creating a boom in new migration flows, the most numerically significant 
of which were from Poland to the United Kingdom, Ireland and Germany, 
and from Romania to Italy, Spain and the UK (Baláž and Karasová, 2017; 
King and Okólski, 2019).
Engbersen and Snel (2013) proposed the term “liquid migration” to describe 
this new era of East-West mobility, characterised by a diversity of types of 
movement, not all of which accorded with conventional definitions of migra-
tion. Such movements included temporary, seasonal, back-and-forth, onward 
and open-ended mobilities, mainly for work reasons but also for study and 
leisure purposes. The defining characteristic of liquid migration, according to 
Engbersen and Snel, is “international unpredictability” – moving abroad with 
an open-minded mentality and without a definitive plan, except, perhaps, to 
be mobile. Others, however, observed that in reality many of these initially 
short-term and open-ended migration intentions subsequently evolved into 
longer-term “grounded” settlement once the ties to the host country became 
stronger, for instance in terms of good incomes, career enhancement, roman-
tic partnership formation and the birth of children (Bygnes and Erdal, 2017). 
Flipping round Engbersen and Snel’s formulation, the model became, at the 
risk of creating an oxymoron, “unintentional predictability”.
Following the main EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007, the succeeding years, 
2008–17, could rightly be termed “the crisis decade”, when a series of exter-
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nal shocks disturbed the continent’s economic, geopolitical and migratory 
landscape. First came the financial crisis which broke in late 2008 and which 
particularly affected several peripheral countries of the EU, none more so 
than Greece, but also Spain, Portugal, Ireland and the Baltic states. Then, in 
2011, came the Arab Spring and its initially optimistic but ultimately cata-
strophic follow-ups; and the crisis decade ended with the Syrian refugee 
crisis of 2015–16. All of these major events, especially the first and the last, 
served to trigger new migrations into and within Europe, fragmenting and 
diversifying existing patterns (King and Okólski, 2019).
The 2000s ended with manifestations of a more xenophobic Europe. Whilst 
Germany claimed the moral high ground in accepting the bulk of the Syrian 
refugees, the trend elsewhere was to resist an expansion of immigration; in 
fact to reduce it. Solidarity towards refugees and appreciation the economic 
logic of migration have been replaced by right-wing populism and nation-
alism, most evident in Hungary, Italy and Brexit-era UK, but present in 
many other countries. Too often, nowadays, immigrants are scapegoated 
for problems not of their own making. Cynical politicians and media mo-
guls demonise immigrants to boost, respectively, electoral impact and prof-
its; yet the reality is that a buoyant circulation of migrants is connected both 
to economic growth and can be a rational response to economic recession 
(Zimmermann, 2014).
After this rapid-fire overview of recent developments in European migra-
tion, what are the implications for how we think about migration as an aca-
demic field of study? For sure, as many have argued, it is a research theme 
to be studied from many angles, ideally in an interdisciplinary or postdis-
ciplinary way (Favell, 2008). But the very definition and conceptualisation 
of migration need to be broadened, in our view, beyond the conventional 
“bipolar” model of origin and destination, around which so much migra-
tion and integration theory has been built.
We see two main directions in which this broadening should take place. 
The first is to “complexify” the way in which migration is thought of and 
defined as a form of space-time movement (cf. Pratsinakis, Hatziprokopiou 
and King, 2017). Migration is much more than a process with a starting 
point and an end point. Return migration, onward migration (from the 
original destination to another one), and various other transnational and 
diasporic mobilities also enter the field. Secondly, migration needs to be 
embedded within the individual’s or family’s life-course. The notion of a 
“migration career” is relevant here (Martiniello and Rea, 2014), since people 
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migrate at different stages of their lives (as children, youth, adults, in old-
age etc.) and with different degrees of agency. They may move multiple 
times, either as separate migration events separated by return migration, or 
in a sequence of linked onward moves involving different destinations. As 
migration scholars we need to embrace this space-time diversity and fluid-
ity of migration, including its intergenerational effects, both now and into 
the future. Finally, we need to acknowledge a fundamental flaw in much 
research on migration, where migrants as an analytical category are com-
pared to non-migrants; in a future-oriented life-course perspective, many 
non-migrants will become migrants and thereby cross the comparative di-
vide between categories.
In the next section of the paper we examine in more detail the under-re-
searched phenomenon of onward migration, followed by a review of some 
European case-studies. The latter half of the paper is a more detailed inves-
tigation of the Albanian onward migration from Greece to the UK in the 
wake of the severe “eurocrisis” in Greece.
WHAT, EXACTLY, IS ONWARD MIGRATION?
Following Nekby (2006) and Ramos (2018), we define onward migrants as 
those who, after living in one destination country, then move to another. 
Strictly speaking, onward migrants move directly from the destination 
country they are in to the next one, although a brief interim return visit to 
the home country might be “allowed” under this definition. A longer period 
of residence in the home country before the new departure would constitute 
return migration, and this would be then be followed by a new migration.
Ramos (2018) stresses that onward migration does not usually reflect a 
planned strategy ab initio, when the migrant left his or her country of origin, 
but arises due to changed circumstances which occur when the migrant is 
in the first destination country, such as discrimination, unemployment, or 
some change in personal circumstances. These could be considered push 
factors for onward migration. Pull factors from the targeted new country 
of destination are also likely to be relevant, if only because these are often 
the flip side of the push factors. Hence, pull factors include higher incomes, 
better career prospects, a more preceptive social environment towards im-
migrants, better education systems for children, or a desire to join a larger 
community of diasporic co-nationals. Several of these factors will be shown 
to be relevant to our Albanian case-study.
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Onward migration is quite common amongst dispersed refugee popula-
tions in Europe. Many refugees from the same origin country end up scat-
tered in different destination countries, due to the rule of claiming asylum 
in the first country of arrival in Europe, plus quota policies on refugee ac-
ceptance. Not unnaturally, some refugees wish to relocate to places where 
there are larger concentrations of their co-nationals or co-ethics (Ahrens, 
Kelly and van Liempt, 2016). Within the “free movement” provisions of the 
EU, refugees who acquire citizenship in one country are free to onward-
migration to another. 
Onward migration is “crowded in” by a number of other terms for rather 
similar migratory concepts: transit migration, stepwise migration, re-emi-
gration, serial migration and twice migration are the main ones. All refer to 
migration trajectories that involve stays in at least two destination countries. 
Whilst some of these could function as synonyms for onward migration, 
there are also distinctions to be drawn. Transit migrants are different from 
onward migrants because they are essentially passing through intermediate 
destinations en route to their pre-determined destination (Collyer and de 
Haas, 2012). Both economic migrants and refugees can be transit migrants 
– for example Central Americans transiting Mexico on their way to the 
southern border of the United States, Sub-Saharan African migrants passing 
through (and maybe getting stuck in) Morocco or Libya aiming for Europe, 
or Syrian refugees transiting Turkey en route for EU countries. Stepwise mi-
gration refers more often to internal migrants moving from village to town to 
city, but may also combine internal and international migration trajectories 
(King, Skeldon and Vullnetari, 2008). An internal migration within the coun-
try of origin can be a first step towards international migration; and in the 
destination country the international migrant might engage in an onward 
internal move to seek out better livelihood opportunities in a different town 
or region. Clearly this is not the same as international onward migration. 
Re-emigration implies a second emigration following a period of return in 
the country of origin, whilst serial migrants see ongoing and repeat migration 
as a form of lifestyle choice (Ossman, 2011). The term twice migrants derives 
from Bhachu’s (1985) classic study on Asian migrants who first migrated to 
British East Africa during the colonial era and then, two or three generations 
later, their descendants migrated to the UK as a result of the “Africanisation” 
policies of the now-independent states in the 1960s and 1970s. This term has 
been little used since, although it was recently reprised in Della Puppa and 
King’s (2019) study of Bangladeshis onward migration from Italy to London.
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The most complete theoretical typology of onward migration in Europe is 
provided by Ahrens, Kelly and van Liempt (2016), in which all such movers 
make use of their accumulated knowledge and experience (known as “mi-
gration capital”) to explore their cognitive maps of where better opportuni-
ties are available. Firstly, career movers onward migrate to overcome barriers 
to employment. These migrants are often located in countries such as Spain 
and Greece which have been most negatively affected by the economic cri-
sis. A second category are student movers who are highly mobile as a group 
anyway, and move onwards to access better university systems and build 
their academic qualifications over two or more countries. Family movers on-
ward migrate to plan a better future for their children; this was a prime 
motivation for the recent trend of Italian-Bangladeshis to move to England 
(Della Puppa and King, 2019). Fourthly, political movers are onward migrat-
ing, self-evidently, for political reasons, to access more open, democratic 
and welcoming societies, and in order to escape political, racist and reli-
gious repression in their first destination countries. Fifth are diaspora movers, 
who regroup with relatives, friends and larger diasporic communities in 
the new destination country, thereby accessing a more “ethnic” way of life 
consistent with their desired lifestyle. Finally there are cosmopolitan movers, 
who are less wedded to their ethno-national heritage and want to explore 
the exciting, multicultural lifestyles of major European cities like London, 
Paris and Berlin. Many have high-level careers which may actually demand 
their onward migration, but certainly enable them to move onward in this 
way.
ONWARD MIGRATION: SOME EXISTING CASES
There is an expanding literature on onward migration in various geograph-
ical contexts; in this review we focus on European cases, leading up to our 
primary research on Albanian onward migrants. Before we do this, we 
briefly acknowledge cases elsewhere, notably in North America. This North 
American literature divides itself into two main types. The first is inter-
national onward migration, either those effecting onward moves between 
Canada and the US, or onward international moves elsewhere in the world 
before the migrants arrive in the US or Canada. For instance, Konadu-Agy-
emang (1999) found that two-thirds of Ghanaian migrants in Canada had 
migrated there after stays in one or more intermediate destinations; this 
onward migration was mainly led by males. Paul (2015) found analogous 
results for Filipinos entering Canada; this time, the typical profile was made 
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up of female domestic and health workers who had first worked in Singa-
pore or the Gulf States, accumulating capital and experience in preparation 
for the onward migration to Canada. Another subgroup of North American 
studies is made up of more statistical analyses of the backgrounds of vari-
ous immigrants moving from Canada to the US (King and Newbold, 2007; 
Mueller, 2004). Artuç and Özden (2016) found that approximately 9% of the 
immigrants arriving in the US between 2001 and 2012 were coming from a 
country which was not their country of origin.
The second type of North American study concerns the onward migration 
of immigrants within the country of arrival and settlement. Typically these 
are Mexican migrants in the US who subsequently move to another state 
or metropolitan area, commonly in a dispersal pattern away from the main 
“gateway” cities of arrival and initial settlement. These moves are usually 
driven by economic considerations, seeking out new work opportunities, 
but may also be related to other factors such as family and social networks, 
or looking for “safer” environments to bring up children. This is a much 
more extensive literature, mainly by population geographers and spatial 
demographers, that we do not review here.
Turning now in more detail to European case studies, there are also divis-
ible into subtypes, including refugee onward movements, onwardly mobile 
students, and the onward moves of labour migrants seeking improved op-
portunities in other countries. As with Albanians leaving Greece, the role of 
the 2008 financial crisis is pertinent to some of these cases, as is the critical 
condition of acquiring a “European” citizenship in order to access the right 
to “free movement”.
A first well-researched case concerns the onward migration of Somali refu-
gees from their countries of first settlement and citizenship acquisition in 
Europe to a second country, which is often the UK. An early paper on Soma-
lis onward-migrating from Denmark by Bang Nielsen (2004) was followed 
by a more detailed study by van Liempt (2011) on “Dutch Somalis” with the 
evocative title “And then one day they all moved to Leicester”. According 
to van Liempt, Dutch Somalis move to the UK to join already-established 
Somali communities in Leicester and major cities like London and Birming-
ham because they anticipate better education and career opportunities for 
their children, better jobs for themselves, and a more receptive and support-
ive environment, both on the part of the established Somali communities 
and the wider British society. They describe how life in the Netherlands, ini-
tially characterised by a tolerant multiculturalism, had in recent years been 
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marked by increasing anti-Muslim sentiments, including acts of violence. 
Van Liempt also found that many of these UK-bound moves occurred right 
after the Somali refugees acquired Dutch citizenship, indicating an element 
of pre-planning in the moves. The Somali case is typical of other refugee 
groups present in Europe, which also show a proclivity to onward-migrate 
to the UK, especially London. Lindley and van Hear (2007) mention Af-
ghans, Congolese, Sudanese, Iraqis and Sri Lankan Tamils in this context of 
the onward migration of ethnic groups with a refugee background.
A second group of studies focuses on the trajectories of West Africans, who 
are remarkably mobile across many countries of Western Europe. The key 
national-origin groups here are Nigerians (Ahrens, 2013), Senegalese (Toma 
and Castagnone, 2015) and Ghanaians (who, as far as we know, have not 
been researched as onward migrants but who are known to be present in 
significant numbers in many European countries and whose family, social 
and professional networks must presumably shape a certain degree of in-
ternational mobility within Europe as well as onward to other destinations). 
Ahrens’ research on Nigerians (2013; also Ahrens, Kelly and van Liempt, 
2016) shows two main patterns: a northward migration from Spain and 
Italy to Germany to the UK; and another, partially linked to the first one, 
of onward migration from Germany to the UK. Amongst the first trajectory 
are many Nigerian women who have been trafficked into the sex industry. 
The latter trajectory is made up of students, skilled workers and labour mi-
grants, but also includes some former refugees from the Biafran war and 
the later years of dictatorship. Complex and shifting transnational family 
networks often underpin these movements. The 2011 British census gives a 
glimpse of the scale of the phenomenon: significant, but not massive. There 
were almost 190,000 Nigerian-born residents living in England, of whom 
5,400 were onward migrants, including 1,464 with German nationality. 
Rather different is Toma and Castagnone’s (2015) more statistical analysis 
of Senegalese migration between Italy, Spain and France, which records mi-
grants moving in all possible directions between the three countries; in this 
study, both onward migration and return migration are referred to by the 
confusing term “remigration”.
A third cluster of cases focuses on the experiences of Latin American mi-
grants in Spain (Mas Giralt, 2017; Ramos, 2018). Such migrants have been 
able to acquire Spanish citizenship after just two years of legal residency 
– a post-colonial favour offered to Latin American Hispanics, and very 
different from the 10-year residence requirement applied to other “third-
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country” immigrants. This case provides a direct parallel to our own, pre-
sented shortly. Onward migration to the UK is seen as a “coping strategy” 
(Mas Giralt, 2017) against the economically devasting effects of the 2008 
financial crisis in Spain on migrants’ livelihoods. Unemployment amongst 
Latin American men in Spain reached 41% in 2012 (Ramos, 2018: 1844). In 
the more complete of the two papers, Ramos (2018) utilises the conceptual 
framework of “migratory careers” (Martiniello and Rea, 2014) to explore 
two interesting variations in her interview data (53 Colombians and Ecua-
dorians interviewed in London). The first is the finding that migrants’ paths 
and motivations can swiftly change during the migration process. In par-
ticular, migration behaviour responds to the unexpected (e.g. the sudden 
onset of the economic crisis in Spain), so that new decisions (e.g. to onward 
migrate) are taken. Second, Ramos points to the importance of the stage in 
the life-course at which onward migration takes place, distinguishing three 
life-course junctures: mature migrants, who are on the whole reluctant to 
leave; mid-career movers, who onward-migrate in order to re-launch their 
careers in a more economically opportune setting; and youthful escapees 
seeking independence and adventure, many of whom came originally to 
Spain as children with their immigrating parents.
Our final case-study in this review are the Bangladeshis in Italy who onward-
migrate to London, where they join the biggest Bangladeshi population in 
the diaspora. Once again, the two interlinked factors of the economic crisis 
and the acquisition of European citizenship are central to the analysis, but 
here in a more nuanced way (Della Puppa and King, 2019; Della Puppa and 
Sredanovic, 2017). Some 3000 Italian-Bangladeshi families are estimated to 
have moved to London in recent years; all have Italian citizenship, although 
in most cases this was not an instrumental act purely designed to facilitate 
emigration (“citizenship to go”), but it was also strategised as “citizenship 
to stay” – to enjoy more rights in Italy as an Italian citizen (Della Puppa 
and Sredanovic, 2017). And the crisis was not the direct trigger mechanism. 
Compared to Spain and Greece, the crisis and its aftermath were more mut-
ed in Italy, and most of the onward migrants had steady, if dead-end, jobs 
working in factories and restaurants. The main driving force was the future 
for the Italian-born children who, their parents’ minds, would struggle to get 
good jobs in Italy and always be racialised as the “children of immigrants”. 
The plan was that they would have much better chances in the UK of parlay-
ing their educational qualifications from British schools and universities into 
the professional employment that they and their families aspired to.
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ALBANIAN ONWARD MIGRATION FROM GREECE TO THE UK
The post-1990 Albanian emigration is arguably the most dramatic of the Eu-
ropean post-communist migration flows: by 2010, according to the World 
Bank, a “stock” of 1.4 million Albanians had accumulated abroad, the vast 
majority of them in Greece (an estimated 600,000) and Italy (400,000), the 
two most adjacent “Western” countries to Albania (Barjaba and King, 2005; 
World Bank, 2011). The scale of this exodus is all the more remarkable when 
we note that the population resident in Albania is less than 3 million. And 
we also need to remember that, unlike other former Eastern bloc countries 
such as Poland and Romania, which have also experienced mass emigration 
since 1990 and particularly since they joined the European Union, Albania 
is not in the EU, so that much of its emigration has been, in one form or an-
other, clandestine or irregular.
Several factors help to explain the large relative scale of emigration from 
Albania. First, the country had just released itself from four decades of re-
pressive autarky under the dictatorial rule of the “people’s leader”, Enver 
Hoxha. During this long span of communist rule, emigration was banned: 
those attempting to escape could be shot whilst trying to cross the heavily 
militarised border, or condemned to long prison sentences as traitors and 
“enemies of the people”. Internal mobility, too, was very tightly controlled. 
Small wonder, then, that when the borders were open (at least on the Alba-
nian side), an emigration of epic, if chaotic and unregistered, proportions 
took place, especially across the mountainous land border with Greece. In-
ternally too, Albania became “a country on the move”; with the pent-up 
frustration of forced immobility removed, people were free to relocate from 
remote highland areas with poor living conditions to Tirana, the capital, 
and to other major towns (Carletto et al., 2006; Vullnetari, 2012).
The largest-scale emigration was to Greece, although the precise numbers 
are impossible to know because of the irregular status of the migrants in 
the 1990s and the large amount of to-and-fro movement across the border, 
including mass repatriations (often followed by immediate re-entry) by the 
Greek authorities at moments of political tension with Albania. What is 
clear that Albanians quickly became the numerically dominant immigrant 
group in Greece, accounting for almost two-thirds of the estimated total of 
around 1 million immigrants in Greece (Barjaba and King, 2005: 13).
Over time, the back-and-forth and irregular nature of the Albanian migra-
tion to Greece evolved to a more settled presence, facilitated by successive 
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regularisation schemes which started in 1998. Most Albanians, however, 
continued to be employed in low-status jobs in the informal Greek labour 
market; these jobs were poorly paid and without proper contracts or social 
insurance. Typical jobs for men were in construction, casual farm labour, 
restaurant work and other manual labour; and for women in cleaning and 
care work. Migrants with high levels of education and professional experi-
ence from Albania – teachers, engineers, artists etc. – were also, for the most 
part, confined to these “immigrant” jobs. Moreover, Albanians in Greece 
became heavily stigmatised by certain political factions and right-wing 
media; they were portrayed as “rough, uncivilised, violent and prone to 
criminality” (Kapllani and Mai, 2005: 164), and as the embodiment of the 
undesirable “communist Other”, Greece’s historical neighbour-enemy dur-
ing the Cold War. This stigmatisation did not exclude, at the individual 
level, instances of great kindness and charity, and over time the tendency 
to stereotype and racialise Albanians has significantly lessened. Many, in-
deed, were on the path towards becoming successfully integrated. Then, the 
Greek financial meltdown, which started in 2008, constituted a rupture in 
this integration and settlement process. Many were forced to leave due to 
unemployment – according to one estimate, 150,000 returned to Albanians 
in the wake of the economic crisis (Barjaba and Barjaba, 2015). Others decid-
ed that a better option was onward migration to another European country.
With this background in mind, we now zoom in on our case-study. A stand-
ard onward-migration trajectory consists of three geographically emplaced 
life phases and two migration decisions: for our participants, the periods of 
their lives spent in Albania, Greece and the UK; and the decision to migrate 
from Albania to Greece, and then from Greece to the UK. The key research 
questions that we wanted to find answers for were concerned with the rea-
sons for onward migration, and how these reasons were related to different 
migration-linked life stages: early life in Albania, life as a migrant in Greece, 
and experiences so far in the UK. We structure our account along these bio-
graphical time-lines, preceded first by a note on methods.
Methods
For this research, 10 semi-structured interviews, averaging one hour in 
length, were carried out with a convenience sample of Albanians in Lon-
don and Brighton who had onward migrated to the UK from Greece. Their 
length of stay in Greece varied from 4 to 24 years and they arrived in the 
UK between 2011 and 2017. The ages of the interviewees ranged from 26 to 
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57 at the time of interview in mid-2017. Seven interviewees were women, 
three were men. The older participants had migrated to Greece in the 1990s 
and had memories of growing up under the communist system in Albania; 
the younger ones had emigrated to Greece during the 2000s and had only 
sketchy memories, if at all, of the communist era. Indeed the youngest par-
ticipant had been born in 1991, the year the Communist Party lost power 
in Albania. Most of the participants were married, with their spouses and 
children with them in the UK. They did a variety of jobs including cleaner, 
care-worker, shop assistant, waiter, mechanic and engineer.
The language of the interviews was Greek, which all participants were flu-
ent in; indeed for some of them, who had spent a long time in Greece and/
or had moved there during their school years, Greek had become their first 
language, displacing the Albanian of their childhood. Although some par-
ticipants expressed an initial reluctance to be interviewed, mostly because 
of their busy working lives, all interviews took place in a relaxed manner, 
and were recorded subject to “informed consent”. The recordings were sub-
sequently transcribed and at the same time translated into English. The in-
terview scripts were then subject to thematic analysis to see both the main 
themes emerging and the degree of consistency across the interviewees. 
Participants were recruited through personal networks, plus some subse-
quent snowballing. They are given pseudonyms to protect their identity 
and any other potentially identifying details, such as precise places of 
work, are excluded or blurred to further ensure confidentiality. In order 
to relax the participants, as well as maximise the information flow, the “at-
mosphere” of the interviews was kept informal and conversational, whilst 
still adhering to a broadly semi-structured format. The interviewees were 
gently encouraged to tell their stories in a broadly chronological sequence, 
starting with basic biographical data and then recounting their lives in the 
three phases and two decision-making events mentioned earlier – life in 
Albania, the initial migration to Greece, life in Greece, onward migration 
to the UK, and life in the UK. They were also invited to comment on issues 
of ethnic and national identity, belonging and integration, social networks, 
work opportunities, and Brexit.
We cannot claim that this small sample is statistically representative; how-
ever, our combined knowledge and previous research on Albanian migra-
tion, and on Albanian migrants in Greece and the UK, enable us to be rather 
confident that the following account approximates the “reality” of onward 
migrants.
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Life in Albania and the migration to Greece
As is extensively documented in the literature (Hall, 1994; Sjöberg, 1991; 
Vickers, 1999; Vickers and Pettifer, 1997), life in Albania under the commu-
nist regime was characterised by poverty, physical hardship, isolation, lack 
of freedom to be mobile, and an obsessive central control by “the regime” 
and its capillary networks of managers, enforcers and informants. The re-
gime nationalised all land, factories, mines and other means of production. 
During this period, Albanians were denied fundamental human rights such 
as travel abroad and the freedom to practice their religion (Islam, Orthodox 
Christianity and Roman Catholicism were the prevalent religions). Above 
all, participants remembered the impoverished living conditions they en-
dured, especially in rural areas (see King and Vullnetari, 2016). Their situa-
tion then was seen as all the more miserable in the light of their subsequent 
experiences in Greece and England.
Maria (aged 38, interviewed in Brighton) remembered growing up in Hi-
mara, a village on the southern coast of Albania:
From Himara you could see the island of Corfu and we used to look at all those 
lights at night. The sea was between us and lots of people wanted to leave. Some 
left at night using tractor inner tubes as floating boats… and some were caught 
and killed or put in prison to frighten the rest of us, so we wouldn’t leave. They 
demolished our Christian churches… that is how the regime was.
[…]
During communism they used to give us 2 kilos of pasta a month to eat, and 1 
kilo of meat… We were hungry… [My mother] was very poor – she would steal 
olives and then press them through a sock to make olive oil… We were a very 
poor family, with six kids.
Similar poignant memories were articulated by other older participants. 
Adriana (57) recalled:
We only knew Coca Cola because the waves washed up the cans and we put them 
out for decoration. Those cans and plastic bottles seemed so beautiful to us…
Later, on their first days in Greece, when Adriana took her young son and 
some other relatives to have a Coke at a café, she laughed when she remem-
bered that no one in the group knew how to open the can. She continued:
My son [aged 8] would look at the shops [in Greece] and constantly call me 
over to see this and that. And he saw a fruit market and he shouts – “Mom, look, 
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apples!” I told him they were not real, but made of wax, because apples that big 
do not exist. But he runs to the stall and sinks his finger-nails into the apple 
shouting “Mom, they’re real!” I felt embarrassed and told him to stop. The man 
selling the apples saw all this scene and he filled a big bag with these apples and 
gave them to us [for free].
These two latter interview clips, about Coca Cola and apples, give both an 
indication of the isolation and privation of life in communist Albania, and 
also an example of one of the many kindly acts on the part of Greeks when 
the Albanian migrants first arrived in 1991. 
Hence, the Albanian migration to Greece during the 1990s (and also to Italy; 
King and Mai, 2008) was largely economically driven: for many it was a 
“route out of poverty” (see De Soto et al., 2002). Barjaba and King (2005) de-
scribed the migrants as “economic refugees”. Whilst the economic rationale 
certainly explains the bulk of the exodus during this first decade of Alba-
nian emigration – at this stage mostly young men seeking casual work in 
the informal economy in Greece – other mechanisms were revealed by the 
interviewees, especially those who migrated later, when migration motives 
were more diversified. Some of the female participants went as part of mar-
riage or family migration to join their (future) husbands who were already 
living and working in Greece. Rea (31) migrated to Greece as recently as 
2009 to live closer to her husband-to-be whom she had met when he was a 
guest at a family wedding in Albania. Other, younger participants had emi-
grated as part of a family migration when they were children – for instance, 
the case of Anna (30) who was moved with her family in 1997 when she was 
10, and Mario (29) who was likewise taken to Greece by his parents in 1999, 
aged 11. Those emigrating at this time, in the late 1990s, also referred to the 
unsafe situation in Albania at that time, due to the country’s own financial 
meltdown, caused by the collapse of corrupt pyramid savings scams and a 
period of civil unrest.
Life in Greece
What do the participants remember about their lives in Greece? In some 
cases this amounted to periods of 20 years and more, during which their 
experiences, material and psychological, changed markedly. Early expe-
riences, conditioned by their irregular status, were mixed, but following 
the regularisation schemes, life improved, at least up until the economic 
crisis.
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The Greek state initially had no policy to cope with the sudden influx of 
Albanians – an estimated 200,000–300,000 in the early 1990s – except peri-
odic mass repatriations known as “sweeping” operations. Some help was 
offered on an ad hoc basis by the Orthodox Church and by others with chari-
table instincts. Adriana, quoted earlier, continued her account of her fam-
ily’s initial welcome:
…the bishop gave us a house to stay in, it belonged to the church. We cleaned 
it up and painted it. The bishop was knocking on doors telling people to give us 
anything they thought might help, and by the end of the evening we had a room 
full of clothes and other nice things.
It should be pointed out that Adriana was a special case because, as part of 
the small ethnic-Greek “Northern Epirote” minority in southern Albania, 
she had grown up speaking Greek and her nominal religion (suppressed 
by Hoxha’s atheist regime) was Orthodox Christianity. She had been able 
to lobby the Greek embassy in Tirana to get passports to go to Greece. 
For nationalistic reasons the Greek government granted special permis-
sion to enter the country to members of the Greek government granted 
special permission to enter the country to members of the Greek diaspora 
who were Greek-speaking and Orthodox – the two main markers of Greek 
national identity. Yet hers was not the only story of help by the church 
that we heard of from the interviews, since the church was also motivated 
to “Christianise” the predominantly Muslim-heritage Albanian migrant 
population. 
Soon after the initial arrivals were “welcomed”, a different reaction set in, 
and those older participants who were early arrivals in Greece also spoke of 
the challenges of coping with racism and rejection, encountered in a range 
of spheres of life, from the labour market to the school playground.
One day my daughter came home from school very upset, because another moth-
er had told her daughter at the school “Don’t you dare play with the Albanian 
girl again!” And my daughter came home crying… this caused her a lot of psy-
chological problems. (Elpida, 56)
In Albania, I was a kindergarten teacher and my husband studied econom-
ics at the university. When we came to Athens my husband had dreams at 
the beginning… For two years, he went all over the city… and every time 
he saw something in the newspapers related to his field, he would go and 
ask… but nothing… So then he started working as a mechanic in a garage. 
(Miranda, 50)
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This next longer extract from the interview with Artur (42) gives a more 
detailed insight into the typical experiences of a teenage boy who migrated 
speculatively in the early 1990s:
I came to Greece in August 1991 when I was 16 years old. We were three 
brothers in the family and the middle brother had arrived before us, so I trav-
elled with my eldest brother. At Iannina [town in northern Greece] we got 
on a bus and came to Athens; my brother was expecting us and slowly we got 
our first jobs. My first job was in construction… and then I started working 
at the central meat market… by then I was 17… So this is how life unfolded, 
from one job to the next… There was no opportunity to be legal and have any 
papers at that time… only if you were a Northern Epirote and had a Greek 
name, only those could find an open window… But in 1997 there was a new 
law and they gave the first work permits, and from then on I could have health 
coverage. But that didn’t mean you were part of Greek society; it’s just a pa-
per that says you don’t have to live under the pressure that you’re going to 
be caught by the police. Because… there were those “sweeping” operations… 
hundreds of thousands of people were caught and beaten up in jail... and then 
put in buses [to take them back to the border]… This is how Greeks treated 
the Albanians back then.
Artur’s experience was typical of the hundreds of thousands of young 
Albanians who walked across the border in the early 1990s and who man-
aged to survive in the Greek informal economy, doing all the tough jobs 
that Greek young men increasingly rejected (see for instance Hatziproko-
piou, 2003; King, Iosifides and Myrivili, 1998; Lazaridis and Psimmenos, 
2000).
Over time, things improved for the Albanians in Greece. Their stigma-
tisation lessened and they began to “integrate”. Part of their integration 
strategy was to “become like the Greeks” – taking Greek names, getting 
themselves and their children baptised into the Orthodox Church, and 
learning to speak Greek fluently (Kokkali, 2015). A similar transition, 
from stigmatisation and criminalisation to tolerance, acceptance and inte-
gration, was underway in Italy, the other major destination for Albanian 
migrants in the 1990s and 2000s (King and Mai, 2008). Especially for the 
participants who arrived in Greece after the late 1990s, a more receptive 
social environment for immigrants was in place, which was also helped 
by Albanians’ adaptability and “ethnic invisibility” (Kokkali, 2015). This 
strategy of mimesis was implemented not without a certain sense of irony 
and sarcasm. Artur again:
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We learnt for our personal and family benefit to take Greek names, to tell one 
or two lies to satisfy the Greek. That’s how things were… so if your name was 
Artur, you had to change it to Vasilis, because it was easier for your boss to call 
you that, as if it was really difficult to pronounce Artur.
Another well-rehearsed sticking-point, mentioned by several participants, 
was the issue of flag-carrying on school parades. There is the custom, on 
special national occasions, such as Independence Day, for the “best student” 
in the school or class to have the privilege of carrying the Greek flag. On 
several occasions up and down the country where the best student turned 
out to be an Albanian pupil, controversy arose. Many nationalistic Greeks 
were offended by the idea of “the Greek flag in the hands of an Albanian” 
(Kapllani and Mai, 2005); others, more liberal, saw this as a celebration of 
Greece’s move towards a multicultural society; whilst on the other side of 
the debate there was the provocative suggestion that the Albanian student 
should carry the Albanian flag – literally a red rag to the bull!
The general picture gleaned from the interviews, however, was of increas-
ingly stable settlement and successful integration. Occupational status im-
proved as people passed across the somewhat blurred divide between the 
informal and formal labour market, moving into more skilled and well-paid 
employment, with some setting up their own small businesses. Increased 
incomes were accrued, even if in most cases it was necessary for both par-
ents to be working to ensure a decent standard of living (true also for most 
Greek families), including a more spacious flat, a car, and holidays (usually 
back in Albania). 
We close this subsection with two typical accounts from our participants of 
how their lives had developed in the years leading up to the crisis. Ariana 
(38) had migrated to Greece in 2002 when she was 22 and newly married, to 
join her husband who was already working there as a window maker. After 
having two children, she found a part-time job working in a delicatessen.
I was really happy with my job. In the beginning I was paid well, around 1000 
euros a month, and my husband 1600, so we were really comfortable financially.
Secondly, Miranda (50), whose highly qualified husband could only find 
work initially as a garage-hand, described how their life developed during 
their increasingly prosperous years in Albania, up to 2008.
He worked in the garage for a number of years until he got to know the job well... 
Then my husband decided to open his own garage for about six or seven years… 
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It went really well, plus I was also working [as a part-time carer], so we had a 
comfortable life. Before the crisis, my husband made really good money, on aver-
age 3000–3500 euros a month.
The Greek crisis and onward migration to the UK
Many of the participant narratives introduced in the previous subsection 
link through to the next stage in their migratory trajectory: the decision 
to leave Greece and embark on a second emigration, this time to the UK. 
Indeed, all those interviewed framed their migration to the UK as a need 
to escape the consequences of the Greek recession, which affected them 
in multiple ways. These included straight unemployment, falling wages 
through short-time work, inability to pay mortgages, rents and bills, and 
lack of career opportunities for younger interviewees and for the second-
generation children of older participants. Furthermore, for those with fi-
nancial obligations back in Albania, such as sending remittances to support 
elderly parents, their ability to sustain these commitments also suffered.
At this point, we pick up some of the narratives of the interviewees already 
quoted, as well as introducing new ones. Artur (42), quoted above, had 
started his teenage working life in Greece doing manual-labour jobs; later 
he “graduated” to restaurant work and for many years was a waiter in Ital-
ian restaurants:
The financial crisis changed things dramatically in Greece. I worked in Italian 
restaurants and I was paid well, 65 euros a day plus tips, and I would get good 
tips as I worked in an up-market neighbourhood in Athens and the clients were 
politicians, journalists and the like, and I was happy. But the first year of the 
crisis I was getting only 43 euros a day, and then my work became irregular. 
And then the restaurant I worked in closed down.
Later in the interview, Artur said:
Although as Albanians we had some problems [in Greece], the thing that kept 
us there was the financial prosperity, the fact that we had good jobs and a good 
life. But when this breaks down, then you realise you have to do something.
The participants gave plenty of evidence that the effects of the crisis on Al-
banian immigrants were highly gendered (Koehler et al., 2010). The Greek 
construction industry came to a virtual standstill, thus destroying the jobs 
of large numbers of Albanian men; whereas certain sectors of the care in-
dustry, which employed a lot of Albanian women, were less affected. This 
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meant that, within immigrant households, men usually lost their jobs whilst 
women retained theirs. Men tried initially to switch to other jobs, but this 
became almost impossible when the economic situation further worsened 
after 2011. Wives continued working but could not support their entire 
families’ livelihoods on their wages alone. This situation also challenged 
Albanian norms of masculinity which resisted the “role reversal” within 
households, because of the “shame” attached to men who are unemployed 
and live off their wife’s earnings. In the words of Maria (38):
Basically, I had a job but my husband did not. I worked in the port, as a cleaner. 
I was paid well and I was happy with the work, but my husband could not live 
off my money, he felt guilty… he is a man.
For the younger and more highly educated migrants, including those like 
Eduard (26), quoted from below, who came to Greece as children and who 
progressed through secondary school and university in Greece, it was not 
just the immediate impact of the crisis, but the lack of career openings to 
match their professional profile and aspirations, as well as what Eduard 
described as the toxic social environment.
There are lots of reasons why I left Greece. Obviously the first one is the finan-
cial crisis and the fact that you can’t see your future in Greece, which is really 
stressful because, otherwise, who wouldn’t want to live in Greece? The second 
reason, there is no room for professional development in my field [engineer-
ing]. And another reason is the mindset that there is in Greece and generally 
in the Balkans, where everybody gossips about their neighbour and complains 
about everything… I couldn’t live in such a toxic environment.
Eduard’s strongly-held view that his professional aspirations could not be 
satisfied in crisis-era Greece (he had the bad luck to graduate at the height 
of the crisis) reminds us of Carling’s (2002) theoretical point that for migra-
tion to take place, a two-stage process has to occur: there has to be first the 
desire to move, and then the ability to do so. Carling’s aspiration/ability 
model seems particularly apposite to help us frame Albanians’ onward mi-
gration to the UK. For most of our participants, acquiring Greek Citizenship 
and hence the “European” passport was the key which opened the door to 
onward migration. In Eduard’s case, he had not yet been successful in secur-
ing a Greek passport; however, his “ticket out” was the offer of a place and 
a scholarship on a specialised Master’s programme in a UK university. For 
others, acquiring the Greek passport was the mechanism to turn aspiration 
into ability: they had the “citizenship to go” (Della Puppa and Sredanovic, 
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2017). Most of the interviewees, like Ariana and Artur below, moved to the 
UK as soon as they obtained the Greek citizenship and passport.
With the crisis, they started reducing our wages; it happened gradually at first. 
They started laying off staff. My husband had already lost his job. My salary 
was reduced from 1000 to 650 euros and so as soon as we got the [Greek] pass-
ports, I told my husband, “Let’s go, because there is no future here”. (Ariana, 
38)
We got it [the Greek passport] in 2013, and as soon as we got it, we left. We 
got it so we could leave… The UK was my first choice, because I know the lan-
guage; it was a strategic choice… I thought that, if I moved to Sweden or Ger-
many, I would need at least a year to learn the language… (Artur, 42)
Most of the participants (7 out of 10) mentioned that they had friends and/
or relatives who were already living in the UK, having migrated there in re-
cent years. This indicates an important principle of onward migration noted 
in our literature review – the role of social networks and the phenomenon 
of joining an already-existing migrant/ethnic community. After Greece and 
Italy, the UK hosts the third largest Albanian community in Europe, prov-
ing to be especially attractive as a destination after the late 1990s, due to 
a combination of direct migration from Albania (often irregular, managed 
by smugglers via Belgium) and onward migration from Greece and Italy. 
Some Albanians also acquired rights to settle in the UK by posing as refu-
gees from Kosovo. A mini-amnesty in 2003 helped Albanians living in the 
UK in a limbo status to acquire legitimate means to remain and became 
British citizens (Vathi and King, 2013). Like other onward migrants to the 
UK, one of the attractions of this country for Albanian families (7 out of 10 
arrived with their children) was the availability of a good, English-language 
school system with ample possibilities for further and higher education and 
career prospects for the “next generation”.
Summarising thus far, onward migration has been an important coping 
mechanism for Albanian migrants in response to the Greek financial crisis. 
Despite all the participants being comfortably settled in Greece with no ini-
tial intention to onward migrate, the economic crisis and their subsequent 
unemployment and drastically reduced incomes forced them to move. 
They strategically acquire Greek citizenship, which removes legal barriers 
to mobility, and move to the UK because they know the language and have 
friends and relatives there. In the UK they also expect to find better em-
ployment opportunities and a good education for their children. Younger 
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Albanians without children, such as Eduard (26) and Mario (29), move to 
the UK to further their higher education – in both cases to follow Master’s 
courses – and enhance their longer-term careers. 
Life in the UK and questions of belonging
Participants’ relatives and friends were instrumental, in most cases, in help-
ing them to settle in the UK, offering them valuable information and practical 
support. They usually provided the incoming migrants with a place to stay 
initially, and then helped them to find more permanent housing, and also 
to find work. For most onward-migrating families with young children, the 
father migrated first, found employment and accommodation, and the wives 
and children followed a few months later. The role of family and close social 
networks is particularly important for Albanian migrants, as “ethnic solidar-
ity” amongst them appears very weak – a characteristic that has been noted in 
several studies on Albanian migration in different contexts (Hatziprokopiou, 
2013; King and Mai, 2008, 2009; Melchionda, 2003). This weak development 
of a formal sense of ethnic belonging has been speculatively linked to Albani-
ans’ reaction to their communist past of forced collectivisation, or interpreted 
as a tactic to distance themselves from a community image which has been 
tarnished by negative stereotypes (King and Mai, 2009).
An interesting aspect of our findings – albeit based on a small sample – is 
the fact that half of the interviewees contacted and took advantage of the 
Greek community and friends in London and Brighton. One participant 
works for a Greek family, partly because she does not yet speak much Eng-
lish. Three participants mentioned that they contacted the Greek communi-
ty through the Orthodox Church, and two found employment through that 
route. When Elpida was asked why she contacted the Greek community 
and not the Albanian one to get help she simply replied: “We Albanians are 
not very organised; the Greeks are”. In terms of employment, all except two 
are working for an income. The exceptions are Mario, who is doing a Mas-
ter’s degree, and Rea, who looks after her small children and hopes soon to 
return to her nursing career. For the others, Artur continues his career as a 
waiter, Eduard works as a technical specialist in London, and the female 
respondents were mostly working in service-sector jobs in shops, offices or 
as cleaners. All found it relatively easy to access employment in the buoyant 
labour markets of London and Brighton.
An interesting question arises in the case of onward migration: where do 
such migrants feel they “belong”? Put differently, what kind of “identity” 
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do they express? In the case of the participants in this research, they have 
physical and emotional links to three countries: Albania, Greece and the 
UK. How does this multi-locality manifest itself in their sense of belong-
ing and of “who they are”? And where, and what, for them, is “home”? 
These are complex questions and we collected and collated a variety of 
answers. One finding, however, stood out, which somewhat surprised us: 
their strong emotional attachment to Greece (albeit not unanimous), despite 
the fact that they were economically expelled by that country’s employment 
crisis, and some had suffered social exclusion there. Maria (38) gave a fairly 
typical evocation of this sentiment:
I still feel my home is in Greece. My home that I built is in Albania, but I don’t 
feel Albanian, I feel Greek, I was settled there for a long time…
But others were more ambivalent; some of the nuances being due to differ-
ences in the length of time spent in Greece, the age at which they migrated 
there, where they did their schooling, and whether they kept frequent con-
tact with Albania. The following two quotes illustrate some aspects of this 
ambiguity of identity:
Greek, I am not. Albanian – I don’t feel. Every time I go to Albania, I no longer 
feel that connection. I don’t think I have an identity. (Miranda, 50)
I feel 50-50. I speak Albanian, I have relatives back there, I go there almost every 
summer. But I am not 100% Albanian, nor am I 100% Greek, so 50-50. But my 
home is Pireaus! (Mario, 29)
Some participants stated that the reason they still identify as Albanian is 
because they never felt fully accepted and integrated in Greece, despite 
their best efforts. They were pushed back by the stigmatisation of Alba-
nians by the wider Greek society and by the lack of any state support 
for their integration. Artur (42) was the most outspoken exponent of this 
view:
I don’t feel Greek because Greece never accepted me. I feel Albanian only because 
I was born there. If I don’t feel Albanian, then I am without identity… I feel Al-
banian because this is how the Greek policy made me feel. Greece doesn’t accept 
you. There is no way that Greece can let you feel 100% Greek, even though I 
lived there for over 20 years, even though I have a Greek passport.
Against the view of Artur was the narrative of Adriana (57) who has re-
jected her Albanian identity in favour of a combination of being not only 
Greek but also a “global citizen”.
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I am not Albanian and I don’t want to be that. I feel Greek and my passport 
is Greek. But everywhere I go I like to adapt and learn new things. To tell the 
truth, I feel more like a global citizen, and I like it that way… A lot of people 
say – you must like Greece, the Greek sun, there is nowhere to compare. And I 
say – sun without money? I prefer rain with money!
What was also interesting was that, when they arrived in England, many 
participants presented themselves as Greek and either deliberately hid or 
simply omitted to mention their Albanian origin. This strategy is probably 
quite rational given their experience in Greece, and also realistic given the 
existence of some media-manufactured prejudice in the UK against Albani-
ans fanned from some isolated acts of criminality and “illegal” entry.
I said to people [at the Greek church in London] that I came from Greece and 
I am looking for a job. I didn’t know how they would react. I just needed a job. 
I don’t feel inferior that I’m Albanian… but I didn’t mention it, so they don’t 
close the door on me. (Elpida, 56)
And Artur again:
If someone only has three minutes and asks me where I’m from, I am going to 
say I’m Greek since I have a Greek passport. I’m not going to explain my life’s 
story.
On the whole, however, participants said that they felt more comfortable 
being Albanian in England than being Albanian in Greece. In England, they 
would say, “no one cares” where you are from, and this give a sense of re-
lease from the negativity that some had experienced in Greece, especially 
during the earlier years. They feel more at ease living in a multi-ethnic soci-
ety and find that London and Brighton are tolerant and accepting of differ-
ent national origins and ways of life. As Elpida related:
I feel happy and settled here: I have a job, my kids, my sister; I’m happier here. 
When I went back to Greece last summer, I felt that pressure again.
These somewhat ambivalent feelings of identification and belonging lead 
to equally divided senses of where “home” is. Most felt Greece to be their 
home, even if much of their earlier lives had been spent in Albania, where 
many of them had invested in property – a “concrete” home. Some ex-
pressed the wish to return to live in Greece one day; and they often placed 
their home within the city neighbourhood in Greece where they lived, which 
demonstrates the importance of localised identity. Anna (30) expressed this 
multi-local allegiance rather well:
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I still feel Albanian. My friends in London are half Albanian and half of them are 
Greek, plus some English. But I definitely don’t feel English. But Thessaloniki 
is my home!
Summarising, and returning to the title of this article, the identities of on-
ward migration are not fixed and static but, like their geographic mobilities, 
are shaped by fragmented and fluid histories of movement. The dynamic 
nature of their identification is clearly demonstrated. Birth and upbringing 
in Albania does not mean that they still hold an Albanian identity. Greek 
citizenship does not necessarily mean that they identify as Greek. Even their 
notion of home does not always match their identity. Nowadays, in Brighton 
or London, they feel more comfortable living in a multicultural society. But 
they are not ready (yet) to see themselves as British or to regard England as 
their “home”, not least because of the ongoing ramifications over “Brexit”.
CONCLUSION, AND A CODA ON BREXIT
At the end of the interview, the participants were asked what they would 
do in the event of a “hard” Brexit – that is, a situation in which the outcome 
of the June 2016 referendum, which yielded a small majority (52%) to leave 
the EU, resulted in the UK having a distant relationship with the EU, mak-
ing life more difficult for the EU-citizen residents. At the time of writing 
(November 2019), things are still very uncertain, with a general election 
pending (12 December 2019) and the “leave” date postponed (yet again) 
until 31 January 2020. Whatever one may think about the rationality of the 
Brexit vote and the chaotic stalemate surrounding its implementation, the 
referendum is interesting in that it represents yet another exogenous shock 
in migrants’ lives. Having already onward-migrated to escape one “shock” 
– the Greek economic crisis – they are now faced with another unprecedent-
ed event which potentially upsets their plans for the future.
Almost with one voice, the answers of the participants to the “hard Brexit” 
question were clear: they would return to Greece. Despite the problems 
they had previously encountered there – unemployment and, for some, a 
sense of exclusion – there was a widespread feeling of nostalgia for their 
lives there, and most still had relatives living in Greece whom they would 
welcome reuniting with. The Greek economy was now seen as less crisis-
ridden than in the past, so there was some hope that the job situation might 
have improved. None contemplated a return to Albania, even if, from mi-
gration statistics and some relevant literature, it is known that many mi-
grants did return from Greece to Albania (Barjaba and Barjaba, 2015; Ker-
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paci and Kuka, 2019; Xharo and Çaro, 2016). Other options considered by 
the participants to be a possibility were to onward-migrate again to another 
EU country or to the United States, but none had concrete plans to do so. 
For the time being, like most other EU migrants in Britain, the actual plan 
was to stay put, “wait and see”, and perhaps take steps to secure their sta-
tus by applying for the “settled residence” card (see Lulle et al., 2019; Lulle, 
Moroşanu and King, 2018).
The ongoing uncertainty of the UK’s future relationship with the EU dem-
onstrates a fundamental point made at the outset of this paper: that onward 
migration needs to be seen not just as a discrete migration event which must 
be added to the wide variety of space-time manifestations of mobility, but 
that it should be “doubly embedded” – firstly in broader conceptualisations 
and mappings of migration as a global and European phenomenon under-
going constant change, and secondly in thinking of this and other kinds of 
move as part of a migration career encased within the individual, family 
and intergenerational life course. 
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Fragmentirane i fluidne mobilnosti: uloga daljnjih 
migracija na novoj karti Europe i Balkana
Russell King, Chaido Karamoschou
SAŽETAK
U radu se istražuju migracije izvan uobičajenoga bipolarnog modela koji uključuje 
porijeklo i odredište. To se čini na dvije razine: konceptualnoj i empirijskoj. Koncep-
tualno se nudi pregled nedavnih trendova razmatranja migracije kao složenijeg i 
raznolikijeg procesa u mjestu i vremenu. Prostorno, a posebice u Europi, migracije se 
pojačano manifestiraju kroz raznolikost trajektorija i putanja u kojima se isprepleću 
unutarnje i međunarodne migracije, tranzitne migracije, daljnje migracije i kretanja 
naprijed-natrag. Vremenski, širi raspon tipova mobilnosti, uključujući povratne po-
sjete i prekogranična prevoženja, može biti obuhvaćen dugotrajnijim migracijama. U 
nastavku rada više se pozornosti posvećuje daljnjim migracijama (onward migration), 
pri čemu se raščlanjuju i analiziraju različiti primjeri studija slučaja iz literature. U 
zadnjem dijelu rada autori donose rezultate vlastitog istraživanja daljnjih migracija 
Albanaca iz Grčke u Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo (UK). Na temelju deset (10) dubinskih 
intervjua s albanskim migrantima u Londonu i Brightonu analiziraju se njihovi ra-
zlozi napuštanja Grčke, gdje su se već, manje ili više uspješno, nastanili. Rezultati 
pokazuju da oni napuštaju Grčku zbog negativnog učinka ekonomske krize na nji-
hove živote i zato što su dobivanjem grčkog državljanstva dobili slobodu kretanja. 
S obzirom na njihovu nevoljkost vezanu uz povratak u Albaniju, uz koji vežu lošije 
mogućnosti za poboljšanje života, odabiru UK kao najbolju opciju, iako Brexit remeti 
tu sigurnost. Prikupljeni podaci uključuju i njihova sjećanja iz života u Albaniji prije 
migracije kao i dojmove o ponovno uspostavljenom životu u Engleskoj.
KLJUČNE RIJEČI: daljnje migracije (onward migration), mobilnosti, Europa, kriza u 
Grčkoj, albanski migranti
